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GESTALT FLIPS* BY AN ACROBATIC SUPREME
COURT AND THE BUSINESS-RELATED CASES
ON ITS 2000-2001 DOCKET
Barbara K. Bucholtz**
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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to consider the business-related cases on the Supreme
Court's October 2000 term in isolation from its unprecedented involvement
in the Presidential election of 2000, famously culminating in two judicial
2
opinions, which had the effect of appearing to decide that election. Not
only are the opinions a radical departure from Supreme Court precedent,
historically, but they also dramatically undermine the Rehnquist Court's
reputation as a restraintist Court and its doctrinal stance on Federalism

* The title is suggested by Professor Step Feldman's description of postmodernist
paradigm shifts. See infra n. 11.
** Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 539-40 (1978). The quoted
statement is from (then)Justice Rehnquist's opinion, in which he describes the arguments
of opposing parties in a nuclear power plant licensing procedure. Justice Rehnquist's quip
appears here, as in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87 (1953), that 'in
reads, in full, "[I]t
this Court the parties changed positions as nimbly as if dancing a quadrille.'" A quadrille
Is a version of the minuet. I have previously used Rehnquist's quip to describe opposing
parties' positions with regard to cases implicating the Rehnquist Court's burgeoning
Federalism doctrine, which the Court has demonstrated, can cut two ways in businessrelated cases. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, PrivateSector Issues in a Public Sector Retro-lution:
The Supreme Court's Business-Related Decisions in the October 1999 Term, 36 Tulsa L.J.
153, 187 (2000). Here I enlist the quip reflexively, suggesting that the Rehnquist majority
itself, in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2001), "nimbly" switched sides from what was
previously considered its entrenched position on Federalism issues.
2. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2001); Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2001). Palm Beach, a unanimous, unsigned (per curiam) decision, reviewed the
Florida Supreme Court's twelve-day extension of the deadline to certify the Florida vote.
The decision vacated and remanded the state court's ruling and requested clarification of
the grounds on which it was reached. When the Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount
of ballots statewide, the Bush Campaign appealed the order. In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Florida Supreme Court's recount order did not provide standards
sufficient to secure Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and that there was no
time to correct the problem. Bush v. Gore was also an unsigned (per curiam) order, but
there was a strenuous dissent. Hence, the slim majority that Bush had garnered gave him
Florida's Electoral College votes and, thus, the presidency.
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issues that the election cases call into question the Court's jurisprudential
identity and perhaps even its credibility.
Early in its tenure, the Rehnquist Court acquired the reputation of
being restraintist and centrist. This image was reflected, first, in the cases
it selected for review. Commentators noted a distinct proclivity in the early
years for avoiding cases that might exacerbate underlying ideological splits
on the Court or in society. 3 Second, the Court was viewed as only
moderately conservative in its doctrinal approach and it was also seen as
moderately conservative in its apparent commitment to retain established,
even liberal, precedent on a broad spectrum of issues.4 Third, the Court
exhibited a clear preference for resolving disputes by rigorous textual
analysis rather than by reference to broad policy considerations. All of
these characteristics led to a perception of the Court as centrist, a Court
with "a very real preoccupation with forming and maintaining a stabilizing
consensus."5 Its decisions with respect to legal issues that impacted the
business community were entirely consistent with that image. The Court
produced moderately pro-business results that were reached, primarily, by
methodical application of traditional rules of statutory construction.6
However, that image was somewhat altered when, in 1992, the
majority laid the groundwork for what emerged by the 1996-1997 term as
a full-fledged revisionist federalism.7 The seminal Federalism cases, now
recognized as a defining feature of Rehnquist jurisprudence, also opened
up a clear ideological fault line that the Court previously appeared at pains
to avoid. 8
Nevertheless, the Court's business-related cases in the
aftermath of its federalism offensive maintained a centrist, moderately probusiness posture consistent with its reputation as a restraintist Court. 9
Insofar as the Court's burgeoning federalism implicated business
cases, business interests lost almost as many cases as they won. 10 On
balance, the Court's track record on business-related cases remained the
same.
The Court's decision to intervene in, and to determine the outcome of,

3. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Business as Usual in a "DollarDemocracy:" A Review of
Business-Related Cases in the 1998-1999 Supreme Court Term, 35 Tulsa L.J. 485, 486 n. 4
(2000) [hereinafter Bucholtz, Dollar Democracy]; Barbara K. Bucholtz, Taking Care of
Business: A Review of Business-Related Cases in the 1995-1996 Supreme Court Term, 32
Tulsa L.J. 449, 462 nn. 140-41 (1997).
4. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Sticking to Business: A Review of Business-Related Cases in
the 1997-98 Supreme Court Term, 34 Tulsa L.J. 207, 208 (1999).
5. Id. at 227.
6. Id. at 207.
7. See Bucholtz, DollarDemocracy, supran. 3, at 485 nn. 2-3.
8. The ideological split in the Court's Federalism cases now consistently pits Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy against Justices Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. See e.g. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savings Bank v.
Fla. PrepaidPostsecondaryEd. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 646 (1999).
9. See Bucholtz, supra n. 1, at 154.
10. See id. at 187.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/7

2

Bucholtz: Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-Rela
2001]

GESTALT FLIPS BY AN ACROBATIC SUPREME COURT

307

last fal's election must be seen as an abrupt departure from its moderate,
restraintist posture and an astonishing contradiction to its evolving
federalism. The Bush cases created such a precipitate reversal in the
majority's doctrinal position that it amounts to what my colleague
Professor Step Feldman, in another context, has aptly described as a
"gestalt switch.""' This doctrinal pas de deaux leaves in its wake important
questions. Principally, these questions focus on the ramifications of the
Bush cases in various venues.
We await the outcome, for example, of repercussions from the Bush
cases, which are being felt in the political arena with a reassessment of the
electoral process. 2 And we know that Bush v. Gore now reverberates in
the lower courts in the form of litigation spawned by its reliance on
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 13 But this article focuses on a narrower
line of questions. What change, if any, do these cases signal in the Court's
approach to issues that affect the business community? Are the Bush
decisions harbingers of a paradigm-shift toward a more ideologically proOr were the Bush decisions
active and ideologically divided Court?
on the Rehnquist oeuvre?
impact
discernible
have
no
anomalies, which will
Perhaps it is too early to draw firm conclusions from this term's
seventy-nine decisions, which were reached within a politicized maelstrom

11. Professor Feldman used the term to describe a postmodernist dexterity or conceptual
acuity in being able to reposition or view a text (or doctrine) through different prisms and
thereby, uncover more and different understandings of it. He says, "[a] postmodem flip is a
gestalt switch or paradigm move that reverses our prior approach to a text... and, in so
doing, reveals previously unrecognized features of that text." Stephen M. Feldman,
Diagnosing Power Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial Practice (With An
Emphasis on the League Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1046, 1047 (1994). Here I co-opt the term and "nimbly" give it an ironic spin. See
Win McCormack, Deconstructing the Election: Foucault, Derrida and GOP Strategy, The
Nation 25 (Mar. 26, 2001). McCormack explains that while conservative intellectuals have
been unrelentingly critical of all ideas they view as "postmodem," the Republican strategy
in Florida, including the successful attempt to involve the Supreme Court in the resolution
of political issues during the electoral process, did just that.
12. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Divided Civil Rghts Panel Criticizes FloridaElection, N.Y.
Times Al (June 5, 2001) (reporting that, although deeply divided, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights had released information on the election process in Florida
which calls the process into question and noting, among other things, the
disenfranchisement of many, primarily African-American, voters in Florida-one of the
problems addressed in Palm Beach and Bush v. Gore. The article also reported that the
Commission has asked the Justice Department for an investigation into whether voting
irregularities violated the national Voting Rights Act). See Dana Canedy, FloridaGovernor
Calls Commission Report on Election Biased, N.Y. Times A20 (June 6, 2001) (reporting
Governor Jeb Bush's criticism of the Commission's findings).
13. See e.g. B.J. Palermo, Rghts Groups Latch Onto Bush v. Gore, 23 Natl. L.J. Al (May
21, 2001) (reporting on cases filed in Georgia, Florida, Illinois, and California by minority
groups asserting unconstitutional disenfranchisement and applying the equal protection
analysis of the majority in Bush v. Gore to their allegations). Palermo writes, "In lawsuits
across the country, civil rights plaintiffs are seeking to use the legal reasoning that put
George W. Bush into the White House to attack error-prone balloting procedures." Id. In
Bush v. Gore, the Court's per curiam opinion states that the Florida Supreme Court's ballot
recount order lacked sufficient specificity to ensure non-arbitrary and uniform treatment of
the ballots and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106.
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created by the Bush decisions. But evidence in the form of the thirty-six
business-related cases the Court decided is certainly a better predictor of
the post-Bush Court than available alternatives (reading tea leaves, for
example). Those thirty-six business-related decisions from the October
2000 term suggest that, following the imbroglio of the presidential election
cases, the Court may not return to its status quo. 14 Certainly, the increase
in 5-4 decisions, which split the Court between its more conservative and
less conservative wings, suggests an ideological turn. 15 This is the same
split that we witnessed in the Federalism cases and that reasserted itself in
Bush v. Gore. This term, six out of the thirty business-related cases were
decided by the ideological 5-4 vote. Six of the nine civil rights cases were
also resolved with the same 5-4 split. Across the docket, twenty out of
seventy-nine cases (twenty-seven percent) were decided by the same 5-4
split. That twenty-seven percent compares unfavorably with twenty-one
percent in 1998-1999 and sixteen percent in 1997-1998.16 Comparing the
business-related cases in prior years with the twenty percent (six out of
thirty) this year, the contrast is stark: only two 5-4 decisions of thirty-six
business-related cases in the 1998-1999 term and only one 5-4 ideological
split in the twenty-six business-related cases decided in the 1999-2000
term.
On the other hand, other statistics suggest that the division of the
Court, while significant, may not be radically destabilizing in future terms.
For example, more than forty percent of the business-related cases this
term were decided without dissents. While the percentage of no-dissent
business-related decisions was slightly higher in previous terms, this
term's slight increase in dissents was not a radical change. For example,
in the 1998-99 term, forty-four percent of business-related decisions were
no-dissent; in the 1997-1998 term, forty-eight percent; in the 1996-1997
term, forty-three percent; and in the 1995-1996 term, forty-eight percent. 17
Moreover, as was the case in previous terms, most business-related
decisions this term were reached by applying technical rules of statutory
construction. These technical rules certainly constitute a narrower ground
for resolving disputes than policy-driven or theoretical grounds. Thus, the
statistical evidence is ambiguous, giving us some reason to believe that we
can anticipate a widening ideological gap and more winner-take-all split
decisions, but also some reassurance of continuing efforts to build a
consensus either by selecting less divisive issues for review or by finding
narrow grounds for resolution. Putting statistical evidence to one side,
14. For a complete list of the business-related cases decided in the 2000-2001 term, see
Appendix A.
15. The make-up of the split replicates the same ideological division of the Court in its
Federalism cases, see supran. 8.
16. See Linda Greenhouse, In Year of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other
Work, N.Y. Times A12 (July 23, 2001).
17. See Bucholtz, DoUarDemocracy, supran. 3, at 486 n. 5.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/7

4

Bucholtz: Gestalt Flips by an Acrobatic Supreme Court and the Business-Rela
20011

GESTALT FLIPS BYAN ACROBATIC SUPREME COURT

309

however, and taking a closer look at the substantive issues raised by the
business cases this term, we are left with the distinct impression that the
Court has executed a gestalt flip.
I.

FEDERALISM AND PREEMPTION

Because the Federalism Revolution first signaled the Rehnquist
Court's ideological divide, it seems appropriate to begin a discussion of the
Court's gestalt flip with that issue and the related issue of preemption,
which offers the Court an alternative basis to consider the tension between
state and federal authority. With one exception, these cases all implicate
the labor and employment issues that are typically the largest category of
business-related cases in any Supreme Court term.
In the Federalism case, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett,18 the majority extended its evolving Eleventh Amendment
doctrine to rule that states enjoy sovereign immunity against suits for
damages brought by state employers under the Americans With
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). This result was reached by a deeply divided Court,
which is typical in federalism cases. In Gamett; Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas broadened the base
of their Eleventh Amendment federalism doctrine.' 9 At issue were several
sections of the ADA which mandated that employers "make reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability... unless [the employer]
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the [employer's] business."20 The Court
considered the application of the rule in two consolidated cases. In the
first case, Patricia Garrett, a nurse employed by the University of Alabama,
was demoted from her former position to a lower-paying job when she
returned to work following an extended sick leave for a lumpectomy and
rehabilitation treatment.2 ' In the second case, the Alabama Department of
Youth Services denied Milton Ash's requests for accommodations to

18. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
19. See e.g. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress has
no authority under Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
from private suit in federal courts); College Savings Bank v. Fla.PrepaidPostsecondaryEd.
Expense Bld., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
impermissibly abrogated state sovereign immunity). The majority's Eleventh Amendment
analysis was somewhat embellished in Seminole Tribe because the majority acknowledged
there that where the Commerce Clause does not give Congress authority for a particular
piece of legislation, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment might lend it sufficient
constitutional support. Then, in City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the majority
said that it was within the purview of the Court to determine whether Congressional
legislation designed to remedy violations of federal rights laws was "appropriate" pursuant
to Section 5. That determination was to be made, said the majority, by application of a
.congruence and proportionality test." Id. at 520.
20. Garrett,121 S. Ct. at 961 (citations and quotations omitted).
21. Id. at961.
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alleviate medical problems.2 s The two state employees filed separate
lawsuits, which were consolidated on the pivotal issue of Alabama's
sovereign immunity.23 Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis of the
issues by quoting the Eleventh Amendment; 24 and he acknowledged that
the Court's recent federalism precedents 25 had extended application of the
Amendment beyond its language to include not only federal suits against
states by citizens of other states but also by citizens of the subject state.2 6
He also recognized that the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity bar
is limited by legislation unequivocally expressing a Congressional intent to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment "pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutionality." 27
Noting that there could be no question of
Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the
provisions of the ADA, Chief Justice Rehnquist narrowed the question to
whether the abrogation passed constitutional muster. Building on his own
28
2
recent precedents and quoting a 1976 case,29 Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that the constitutional predicate is to be found in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 30 Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce
the prohibitions against the unconstitutional exercise of state power
identified in Section 1. Casting the Section 5 analysis as one that
implicates the Equal Protection Clause of Section 1, Chief Justice
Rehnquist invoked the rational basis test as the proper standard for
evaluating a state law, which has allegedly violated an individual's equal
protection rights. 3 1 That test states that absent a showing that (1)
Congressional attempts to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment were
supported by evidence of a history and pattern of discrimination by the
states in violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The full text of the of the Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. art. XI.
25. Kimel, 528 U.S. 621, Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 666, and Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
26. Chief Justice Rehnquist also cited a nineteenth century case, implying that his
decision was dictated by the venerable precedent: Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Garrett,
121 S. Ct. at 962. It is perhaps instructive to note that beyond the cases decided recently
(and fractiously) in his own Court, the Chief Justice was able to cite only one precedent in
support of extending the words of the Eleventh Amendment text.
27. Garrett,121 S. Ct. at 958 (citations and quotations omitted).
28. Kimel, 528 U.S. 621, Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 666, and Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
29. Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
30. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes State
laws which "abridge the privileges and immunities..." of U.S. citizens or "deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law..." or deny any person "equal
protection of the laws" and section 5 of the Amendment gives Congress the power to
enforce the constraints of Section 1. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
31. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 ("Under rational-basis review, where a group possesses
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to
implement, a State's decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give rise to a
constitutional violation" (citations and quotations omitted).
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Congressional response was "congruent and proportional to the targeted
violation," the presumption of rational basis conferred on state action
would not be overcome. 32
Here, wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Congressional evidence of a pattern of discrimination against the disabled
was too generalized and anecdotal to meet the evidentiary burden and in
any case, the remedy provided under the ADA was not proportional to any
transgressions by the states.3 3
In dissent, Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg asserted
that the majority's analysis failed to show proper deference for the
Congressional findings that led to enactment of the ADA. The majority,
said the dissent, was holding Congress to an inappropriately high standard
of evidentiary proof?3 It is interesting that the dissent chose to challenge
this fact-driven application of the majority's newly-minted Eleventh
Amendment doctrine rather than the doctrine itself.3 5 Be that as it may,
Garrett by a one-vote majority, continues to shift power to the states at the
expense of Congressional authority and individual rights granted by that
authority.
Commentators on both sides of the ideological divide forecast that this
shift in the balance of power will continue unabated and they expect
Garrett's expanded sovereign immunity doctrine to be applied to other
sections of the ADA as well as to federal civil rights laws in the near
future. 36 Henceforth, litigants seeking to enforce similar federal rights
pursuant to similar federal statutes must survive the one-two punch of
Garrett'sassault: first, they must show a legislative record documenting a
discernible pattern of discrimination by the states themselves and not by
the public at large; second, they must convince the Court that the
legislative remedies provided by Congress are proportionate to the harm.
In the latter regard, the majority has made it abundantly clear that it will
not defer to Congressional evaluation of what is "appropriate legislation" to
remedy state violations of any federal law that was enacted pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 And because the majority has
32. Garrett,121 S. Ct. at 966.
33. Id. at 965-67.
34. Id. at 969-72.
35. Alternative grounds for assailing the majority's analysis in Garrett include the
argument that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
included for the express purpose of foreclosing state nullification of federal law. "Privileges
and immunities" have been consistently defined to mean rights granted by Congress within

the scope of its authority. Therefore, argues Professor William J. Rich, "Once the Court
determines whether Congress acted within its powers... [here, to grant federal rights to
citizens under the ADA the Court] has no basis for strikng down remedies Congress
adopts to protect newly established privileges or immunities." William J. Rich, Court Got
Wrong Number, 23 Natl. L.J. A21 (June 25, 2001).
36. See e.g. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Give the States Immunity from Suits by Disabled
Workers, N.Y. Times Al (Feb. 22, 2001). Greenhouse discusses imminent Supreme Court
review of the ADA rule requiring governments to make their services and facilities
accessible to the disabled.
37. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 974-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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taken for itself the exclusive authority to decide what is sufficient proof of a
discriminatory practice and what is "appropriate remedial legislation," it
seems certain that virtually every state action which violates similar federal
statutes will evade Congressional sanctions. Chief Justice's Rehnquist's
words support that prediction:
States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special
accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such
individuals are rational and [tlhey could quite hard headedly-and
perhaps hard heartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do
not make allowance for the disabled.3
Clearly, the rational basis test articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist
will prevail in most cases. But other venues for expanding Rehnquistian
federalism are also available.
Commentators generally agree that to
complete its federalism retro-lution, the Court will have to curtail the
spending clause power of Congress. 39 As a matter of fact, Garrett offered
the Court an opportunity to do just that, because the respondents brought
the case under the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
40
1973.
The Rehabilitation Act, and similar statutes, tie receipt of federal
funds to state compliance with the Act's provisions. This gives Congress
significant leverage to regulate state conduct. The fact that Garrett
declined the opportunity to evaluate the case on power-of-the-purse
grounds is some indication that it is reluctant to attempt an extension of
its federalism doctrine in that direction, at least at this juncture. As one
commentator has stated, the stakes on this constitutional issue are
extremely high:
If plaintiffs can sue the states under spending conditions enacted by
Congress, the Court's recent federalism rulings can be rendered
meaningless. On the other hand, if the justices knock down Congress'
power over the purse strings, they will have completed a revolutionary
change in the balance of power between Washington and the states. 41
The last time the Court heard a spending clause case, it upheld the
Congressional use of its purse strings leverage. 4 2 However, Justice
O'Connor dissented in that case because she felt that the spending clause
did not give Congress authority, through its purse string leverage, to
compel the states to conform to a uniform drinking age statute. 43 The
O'Connor dissent may signal the majority's strategy: to wait for a case with
a broad disconnect between the Constitutional spending clause provision

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 964.
See e.g. David G. Savage, The Next FederalismFrontier,87 ABA J. 30 (2001).
Id.
Id.
S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See id.at212.
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and the federal law for which it serves as regulatory leverage. 44 ' Then,
having established a beachhead on the basis of a factual disconnect, the
majority may find it easier to make inroads into Congressional spending
clause power.
While Garretta case involving a public sector employee, has no direct
impact on private sector business interests, it is part of an expanding
panorama threat does not impact the private sector: an evolving federalism
doctrine and the contiguous realm of preemption. The Court addressed
four preemption cases this term; two of them, like Garrett; were also
employment issues cases. The exceptions were LorillardTobacco Company
v. Reilly45 and Buckman Company v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee.46 At issue
in Lorillard were regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts Attorney
General with regard to the sale and advertising of cigarettes, cigars, and
smokeless tobacco. 47 The tobacco industry challenged the regulations
arguing, among other things, that some of the regulations were preempted
by less stringent standards in federal law: the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act ("FCLAA"). The industry also argued that other
regulations infringed on the industry's commercial free speech rights under
the First Amendment. 48 Because the FCLAA covers only cigarette products,
the preemption challenge focused exclusively on regulations with respect to
the sale and advertising of cigarettes. Regulations covering the sale and
advertising of tobacco products were addressed under First Amendment
analysis.4 9 With respect to both preemption and the First Amendment, the
majority's analysis covered several kinds of regulations and the result was
a structurally complex decision.
With regard to the preemption issue, the Court split ideologically 5-4,
with the majority agreeing with the cigarette industry that the FCLAA
preempted Massachusetts's more stringent regulations. In response, the
dissent chided the majority for contradicting its own precedent. In
Lorillard, the majority held that outdoor and point-of-sale advertising for
cigarettes was preempted by federal law. But preemption analysis was
rejected in an arguably similar case, United States v. Lopez, 0 where the
Court struck down federal law that attempted to regulate gun possession
in close proximity to schools. The Lorillardmajority rejoined that because
the target of the regulations in Lorillard was cigarette advertising in any
44. Id.
45. 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001).
46. 531 U.S. 341 (2001). The Lorillardcase covered multiple classes of tobacco products;
however, the preemption ruling covered only the cigarette industry, while First Amendment
analysis covered smokeless tobacco and cigar products. Id. at 2413-14. For an analysis of
Buckmaon, see infra nn. 235-37.
47. Lorilard, 121 S. Ct. 2404.
48. Id. at2410-11.
49. Id.
50. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress had exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause by enacting the Gun Free School Act).
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location which implicates the health concerns of the FCLAA, the case was
factually distinguishable from Lopez, where the state challenged the
authority of federal law to institute what amounted to zoning regulations
and thereby to co-opt traditional police power authority. 51 Nevertheless,
the entire Court agreed that Congress did not intend to foreclose state
regulation of cigarette sales to minors or local zoning restrictions on
advertising in order to address traffic safety issues or other traditional
police power concerns.52
The Lori/lard preemption decision this term favored the tobacco
industry, just as the business-related preemption cases last term,5 3 favored
business interests. Last term all four preemption cases that affected
business ruled that state regulation of a particular industry was preempted
by a federal regulatory scheme and that result shielded the business
interests from more stringent state regulation. Thus far, the Court's
preemption analysis has served business interests well and continues to
serve the Court as an alternative ground for resolving states' rights issues.
It should be noted that, ideologically speaking, conservative and liberal
wings of the Court tend to "dance the quadrille" in these preemption cases;
the more conservative wing has consistently found preemption and has
given its imprimatur to the less rigorous Federal regulations while the less
conservative wing has often found no preemption and weighed in on the
side of states' rights. Preemption cases this term evidenced no facial
change in the Rehnquist Court's preemption doctrine. However, they may
be harbingers of a widening ideological split, as the 5-4 vote tally extends
from federalism cases to include preemption cases as well.
Because other articles will deal with the First Amendment aspects of
the Lori!lard case, this article will focus on only two points regarding the
Court's First Amendment analysis. First, the Court reached a pro-industry
result, finding that the state's restrictions on outdoor advertising violated
the industry's commercial free speech rights. 54 Thus, Lorillard is
indisputably a pro-business result on both preemption and First
Amendment grounds. And, without doubt, the tobacco industry will feel
confident in challenging similar regulations in other states. 55
Second, the tobacco industry had hoped to achieve more than a
favorable result in Lorillard. It had hoped to win decisively on free speech
doctrine as well: to expand commercial free speech rights, as other
51. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
52. Id.
53. Crosby v. Nat. For. Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Geier v. Am. HondaMotor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk So. R.R. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) and U.S. v.
Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
These four cases set forth the Rehnquist Court's
preemption doctrine.
54. Lori~lard, 121 S. Ct. at 2413-14.
55. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rein In Local Regulation of Tobacco Ads, N.Y. Times
Al (June 29, 2001) (stating that similar tobacco regulations in New York City, Chicago, and
Baltimore are now in jeopardy following the result in Lorillard).
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industry litigants had in recent cases, 5 6 by convincing the Court to
abandon its four-pronged Central Hudson test." This test distinguishes
between commercial speech and other kinds of speech and offers less
protection to the former. But the Court refused to abandon the Central
Hudson test, finding for the industry on much narrower grounds: that the
states' regulation was not a reasonable fit with its goal of combating use of
tobacco products by minors. The regulations at issue, therefore, failed the
fourth step in the CentralHudson test.58 Thus, the Lorillardcase was a win
for the tobacco industry, but it was only moderately pro-business and
made no changes in either preemption or commercial speech doctrine.
There was, however, some evidence of a widening ideological split in the
application of the Court's preemption analysis.
The other two cases decided on preemption grounds this term could
be categorized as employment cases. The first, Egeihoff v. Egelhoff,59 was
an employment benefit case. There, the Court ruled that Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") preempted a Washington statute
that nullifies prior beneficiary designations in benefit plans due to divorce,
because the Washington statute was "related to" an ERISA plan.60
Engelhoff had named his second wife as beneficiary of his life insurance
and pension plans under his employer's ERISA benefit plan.
Subsequently, Engelhoff and his second wife were divorced, but before he
changed his beneficiary, he died intestate. His children, by a previous
marriage, argued that the statute entitled them to the proceeds of the
plans. His former spouse argued that ERISA, which provides that a plan
administrator must comply with the beneficiary designations made by the
employee, entitled her to the proceeds.
The Court granted certiorari to resolve a division in the circuits on
this issue. And, on grounds of express preemption, it found that ERISA
preempted the state statute. In so doing, the majority looked specifically at
section 1144(a) of ERISA which mandates preemption whenever a state

56. The majority noted that similar challenges were mounted recently in GreaterNew
OrleansBroad.Assn., Inc. v. U.S., 527 U.S. 173 (1999) and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517
U.S. 484 (1996).
57. The Central Hudson test imposes a less-than-strict scrutiny test for analyzing the
constitutionality of commercial speech regulation. Its four-part test asks: 1) was the
commercial speech legal and not misleading? If so, it passes the first hurdle of First
Amendment protection. 2) Did the governmental regulation seek to protect a substantial
government interests? If so; 3) did the regulation directly advance the interest? And, if so,
4) did the regulation evince a reasonable fit between ends and the means of regulation? In
Lorilard,only the third and fourth parts of the test were at issue. The majority found that
while the regulations at issue met the requirements of the third prong, they failed to satisfy
the fourth prong. The broad sweep of the regulations indicates that the Attorney General
did not "carefully calculat[e] the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech
imposed by the regulations." Loriard,121 S. Ct. at 2453 (citations omitted).
58. Lori!!ard,121 S. CL at 2425.
59. 121 S. Ct. 1322 (2001).
60. Egelhoff, 121 S. Ct. at 1327.
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law "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan. 6' The Court also considered precedent
that has determined that "relates to" means "has a connection with" in the
sense that it affects the objectives of ERISA and has an impact on its
provisions. 6622 Because the automatic revocation provided by the statute
negatively impacted ERISA's goal of providing uniform administrative rules
for plans by placing administrators at risk of liability for distributing plan
assets to the wrong beneficiary, the state statute "relates to" ERISA and is
preempted by it. 63 The case was decided by a majority of seven. Two
dissenters argued that the majority defined "related to" too broadly.64

III. ARBITRATION
The third business-related preemption case this term implicates not
only employment issues, but also arbitration, which is one of the most
important categories of cases decided this term. And it was, notably,
decided by the ideological 5-4 split. CircuitCity Stores, Inc. v Adamis 65 is
ostensibly a case decided on the narrow grounds of statutory
interpretation. At issue was the class of contracts covered by the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Specifically, the Court was asked to decide what
kinds of contracts were excluded from its coverage. Section 2 of the FAA
compels courts to enforce arbitration clauses included in contracts
covered by it.
Section 2 reads in part, "a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such ground as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. " 6 6 Section 1 of the FAA expressly excludes
from the Act's coverage, "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 67 In Circuit City, Adams signed an employment contract
containing a mandatory binding arbitration clause when he accepted a
job as a sales counselor at Circuit City. 68 When he subsequently filed a
discrimination suit under California law against Circuit City, it sought to
enjoin the suit and compel arbitration. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, pointed out that all the other circuits to consider the issue had
construed the language of section 1 more narrowly, finding that it only
excluded employment contracts in the transportation industry. 69
Enlisting one of the traditional rules of statutory construction, ejusdem

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1330 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
Cir. City, 121 S. Ct. at 1307.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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generis, Kennedy looked at the language of section 1 and found that the
general term of "contracts of employment" was followed by and therefore
limited to the specific kinds of employment listed therein: seamen,
railroad employee or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce. The majority concluded the limiting language
applied only to transportation workers engaged in interstate
,,70
commerce ....
A vigorous dissent, however, took issue with the application of
ejusdem generis and found instead that construing the term "contracts
of employment" in light of the legislative history of the FAA leads to the
conclusion that Congress did not intend the Act to cover employment
contracts. Rather, in 1925 when the FAA was passed, Congress was
concerned with the Courts' refusal to enforce arbitration clauses in
commercial maritime contracts. 7 '
If nothing else, the case points to an obvious characteristic of the
ostensibly narrow and technical invocation and application of the
traditional rules of statutory construction: often application of the rules
is not merely technical because, as in this case, the rule selected
determines the outcome reached. Strictly speaking, it may be improper
to look beyond the express terms of the statute to resolve the meaning of
the terms unless they are somehow ambiguous. But ambiguity, as in
CircuitCity, may be in the eyes of the beholder.7 2 Furthermore, statutory
construction rules, despite their apparently narrow focus, lead to broad
results. At issue here was whether the FAA covers the entire universe of
employment contracts. The majority found that it does. Circuit City was
one of several arbitration cases considered this term. It joins a growing
body of Supreme Court case law that seeks to encourage private
resolution of various disputes by enforcement of arbitration provisions in
commercial, consumer, and employment contracts.
Circuit City
accomplished a pro-arbitration result by giving a broad reading to the
FAA. And in the wake of similarly pro-arbitration decisions in recent
terms, big business has responded by requiring new hires to agree to
mandatory arbitration for work-related disputes. Obviously, arbitration
is viewed by business as a significant cost saver in terms of time and
litigation expenses.7 3 Therefore, CircuitCity is a clear win for business.
Not only does the current Court's majority reflect a distinct
preference for private dispute resolution through arbitration but a
growing body of its decisions reinforces the preference by exhibiting a

70. IcL at 1306.
71. Id. at 1314 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
72. See Bucholtz, supran. 4, at 207 n. 3.
73. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Says Employers can require Arbitrationof Disputes, N.Y.
Times Li (Mar. 22, 2001). But see Darryl Van Duch, No Arbitration "GreenLight" 23 Natl.
L.J. B9 (Apr. 9, 2001).
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definite inclination to defer to an arbitrator's decision. This term,
EasternAssociated Coal Corporationv. United Mine Workers of America,
District 1774joined that trend in a unanimous decision that held an
arbitrator's reinstatement of a truck driver, who had tested positive for
marijuana use twice, should not be reversed. 75 The arbitrator found that
termination under the circumstances of the case did not meet the "just
cause" standard required for employee discharge under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") and therefore the arbitrator reinstated the
employee.7 6 The Court disagreed with the company's argument that the
arbitrator's award contravened important public policy considerations
with regard to safety and it affirmed the award. The Court said the
public policy grounds for overruling an arbitrator's findings are narrow
77
and must rest on "an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy."
The Company had argued that the Omnibus Transportation Employee
Testing Act of 1991 ("Testing Act") evinced an explicit public policy
against use of illicit drugs in situations where safety is vital, "[including]
the operation of trucks. . . ."78 However, the Court found the goals of the
Testing Act to be more "complex," noting that a strong component of the
act is "rehabilitation."7 9 Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer concluded,
"neither the act nor the regulation forbid an employer to reinstate in a
safety-sensitive position an employee who fails a random drug test once
or twice."80 Relying on public policy favoring CBA'sP' and demonstrating
the Court's distinct preference for arbitration, the Court deferred to the
arbitrator's award. The case obviously stands for the proposition that
while arbitration as a system may favor business interests; a particular
arbitration award may not.
In the third arbitration case considered this term, Green Tree
FinancialCorp.-Alabama v. Randolph,8 2 the Court, by another ideological
5-4 split, held that an arbitration clause in a consumer contract was not
rendered unenforceable on the grounds that it was silent on the issue of
83
which party pays the arbitration costs and fees.
Citing the FAA, the
Court reiterated its intention pro-actively to follow the Act's directive to
enforce arbitration agreements. The subject matter of the consumer

74. 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
75. Id at 59.
76. Id. at 60.
77. Id. at 63.
78. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
79. Id.
80. E. Assoc. Coal, 531 U.S. at 68.
81. Id. (citing Calif.Brewers Assn. v. Bryan, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980), which stated "it
is this Nation's longstanding labor policy to give employers and employees the freedom
through collective bargaining to establish conditions of employment") (citations and
quotations omitted).
82. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
83. Id. at 80-81.
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contract in this case was the purchase of a mobile home.
The
installment contract and security agreement, which were executed with
the mandated binding arbitration agreement, expressly waived all rights
to a jury trial.& Consumers sued, asserting that the arbitration clause
violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA7) because costs and
fees associated with arbitration might prove prohibitively expensive and
force her to forego enforcement of her statutory rights.85 Citing its
increasingly long line of cases favoring enforcement of arbitration
clauses, the majority upheld the arbitration clauses and ruled that a
party seeking to avoid enforcement of an arbitration clause on the
grounds of prohibitive costs has the "burden of showing the likelihood of
incurring such costs." 86 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent,
declared that the appropriate action for the Court would be to vacate and
remand to develop the record on the issue of arbitration costs. Relying
on the contract principle that contracts should be construed against the
drafter and noting that the company in this case "as a repeat player in
the arbitration required by its form contract.., had superior
information about the cost to consumers of pursuing arbitration, " 87 the
dissent found the majority's approach to be premature.8 8
Two other business-related arbitration cases were reviewed this
term. In Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey, 89 the
Court, by a 7-1 per curiam, again expressed its preference for
enforcement of private dispute resolution mechanisms when it declared
that courts have very limited grounds for overturning an arbitrator's
award, as long as the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority
under the CBA. 90 At issue in Garvey was an arbitrator's ruling that
Garvey, a retired first baseman, had not offered sufficient proof of his
claim against the San Diego Padres. 91 In reversing the district court's
order refusing to vacate the arbitrator's ruling against the ballplayer, the
Ninth Circuit held that in situations like Garvey's, where the arbitrator
had rendered an "inexplicable" decision which "border[ed] on the
irrational" and amounted to "dispensing his own brand of industrial
justice," then a court was authorized to review the case on its merits and
to vacate the arbitrator's award.9 2 But the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit, reminding it that courts may not review an award on the

84. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 83.

85. Id.
86. IdL at 92.
87. Id. at 96 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Souter & Stevens, JJ., dissenting in part,
concurring in part).
88. Id.
89. 121 S. Ct. 1724 (2001).
90. Id. at 1729.
91. Id. at 1726.
92. Id at 1727.
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merits even in response to "factual errors or misinterpretations of the
parties" agreement. 93 Referring to its decision this term in Eastern
Associated Coal, which had relied on an earlier precedent, Paperworcers
v. Misco, Inc.,94 the Court declared, "if an arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority,' the fact that 'a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision." 95 Garvey is, thus, another
brick in the wall protecting arbitration from judicial review.
Finally, the Court unanimously held in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe 96 that by executing a construction
contract with a mandatory binding arbitration clause, the tribe had
waived its sovereign immunity from a lawsuit to enforce the arbitrator's
award against it. 97
This Court is pro-actively pro-arbitration. In the 2000 term alone,
arbitration withstood challenges premised on (1) the reach of the FAA; 98
(2) proper deference to arbitrator's awards; 99 (3) the burden of prohibitive
costs associated with arbitration; 100 and (4) the shield of sovereign
immunity. 1 1 Without doubt, much of the impetus for the Rehnquist
Court's position lies in its affinity with the private sector: the tendency to
favor it as a preferred venue for resolving societal issues, generally, and
in particular, its preference for private dispute resolution of legal issues.
And its preferences with regard to the latter are supported by a
longstanding public policy shift in favor of arbitration, as is evidenced by
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. The express purpose of the Act was
to "reverse... judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts .... ,o2
Since that time, an expanding body of case law has
struggled with the appropriate jurisdictional reach and the proper
balance of authority between arbitration and judicial oversight. 103
Undoubtedly, the Rehnquist Court's decisions in the last ten years have
had a major impact in resolving the tension in favor of arbitration. And

93. Id. at 1728.
94. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
95. Garvey, 121 S. Ct. at 1728 (citations and quotations omitted).
96. 121 S. Ct. 1589 (2001).
97. Id. at 1594-95.
98. Cir. City, 121 S. Ct. 1302.
99. PotowatomiIndian Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 1589; Garvey, 121 S. Ct. 1724.
100. Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79.
101. PotowatomiIndianTribe, 121 S. Ct. at 1598.
102. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991).
103. See e.g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(holding arbitration contracts involving the Sherman Act enforceable); Shearson/Ar.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 200 (1987) (holding arbitration contracts involving
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act enforceable); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Amr Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding arbitration contracts involving
RICO enforceable).
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the business community has reacted positively to the trend, viewing
arbitration as a cost-efficient way of resolving disputes.1°4 Nevertheless,
it would be a mistake to assume that the evolution of arbitration
doctrine is nearly complete or that its defining features will ineluctably
follow a pro-arbitration pattern. In fact, major issues in arbitration
doctrine remain to be resolved, and the uncertainty of the outcome on
many issues gives the business community pause, and makes many
businesses reluctant to opt for arbitration agreements across the board.
As examples of the remaining indeterminacies of the doctrine, it is still
unknown how the Court will resolve: (1) the problem of what limits might
still be placed on arbitration with respect to disputes involving Title VII,
the ADA, and other civil rights statutes; (2) the extent to which
arbitration might limit punitive damage awards; (3) or curtail the use of
class actions involving federal anti-discrimination laws; (4) the
enforceability of arbitration clauses which require prospective employees
to accede to arbitration as a pre-condition of employment; (5) federal
preemption of state employment law on arbitration issues; and (6) the
applicability of the Seventh Amendment to arbitration clauses purporting
to waive jury trials.
Thus, while many big businesses had opted for arbitration clauses
in employment contracts even before the Circuit City decision was
rendered; these remaining open questions counsel caution and a "wait
and see stance" for other businesses.10 5 Finally, on the other side of the
ledger, issues of basic fairness will continue to cast a shadow on the
CircuitCity decision and the Court's other arbitration decisions, not only
with regard to employees' interests but also those of individual
consumers.
In his dissent in Circuit City, Justice Stevens reiterated several of
the points he made in his dissent to the majority opinion in the earlier
case of Gilmer. There, he chided the majority for ducking the issue
finally resolved in Circuit City: whether Congress intended the FAA and
its policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements, to cover
employment contracts between employers and employees or only
commercial agreements between business enterprises. In his Gilmer
dissent, Justice Stevens made two major points: first, that Congress did
not intend the FAA to cover employment contracts, as was evidenced by
the Act's legislative history; 1 6 and, second, that to do so would have

104. See Greenhouse, supra n. 73; Suzette M. Maleveaux & Joseph M. Sellers, Justices
Deal Blow to Court System. 23 Natl. L.J. A22 (May 7, 2001); Marcia Coyle, "Arbitration
Heaven"Ahead, 23 Natl. L.J. 31 (Apr. 2, 2001).
105. Greenhouse, supra n. 73 (quoting a partner at New York's Brown & Wood, noting
that a resolution unfavorable to business might render an employment arbitration program
"a futile exercise").
106. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens declared, "[t]here is
little dispute that the primary concern animating the FAA was the perceived need by the
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been patently unfair because of the unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees. 10 7 That dissent and the dissenting opinion in
Circuit City join a host of statements by detractors who allege that "the
steady erosion of the court system in favor of privatized dispute
resolution" threatens basic procedural and substantive rights "that most
Americans take for granted."'0 8 Based on the foregoing, it seems clear
that while the development of the arbitration doctrine developed by the
Rehnquist Court has met with favor in the business community, its
structure is incomplete and tentative in many important respects, and so
its final contours may modify its current pro-business form. Therefore,
the wait-and-see attitude of many businesses has substantial merit.
IV.

OTHER LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT CASES

In addition to employment cases resolving the preemption and
arbitration issues discussed above, the Court considered various other
employment disputes.
In Pollard v. E.L Dupont de Nemours & Company,'0 9 a unanimous
court held, in a Title VII sexual harassment case, that "front pay""0 was
not a part of "compensatory damages" as described in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 and, consequently, was not subject to the compensatory damage
cap. The resolution of this issue, clearly a loss for business, was hotly
disputed because the import of the applicable sections of the statute was
not readily apparent. At the center of the dispute were two facially
conflicting sections of the law. Section 1981a(a)(1) expands the remedies
available under the 1964 Civil Rights Act at section 706(g) (injunction and
monetary remedies including "but not limited to reinstatement with or
without back pay")"' and as the Act was amended in 1972 (to include, in
2
addition "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate")."
Section 1981a(a)(1) under the 1991 Act expressly adds compensatory and
punitive damage awards to the list of previously available remedies but

business community to overturn the common law rule that denied specific enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate in contracts between business entities." Id.
107. Id. at 41-43. Stevens also argued that use of binding arbitration in resolving civil
rights legislation like the ADEA and Title VII would frustrate "the essential purpose" of
these statutes,
to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the
right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer to arbitral
decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had long perpetrated
invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the chickens.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
108. Maleveaux & Sellers, supra n. 104, at A22.
109. 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001).
110. "Front pay," according to Justice Thomas, is "simply money awarded for lost
compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of
reinstatement." Id. at 1948.
111. I& at 1950.
112. I&
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caps them, pursuant to the provisions of section 1981a(b)(3)," 1 3 on a

variable scale depending on the size of employer's work force. The question
was whether the cap at section 1981a(b)(3) applied to front pay under the
compensatory damages, permitted at section 1981a(a)(1). The Court said it
did not. Rather, said the Court, "front pay" was an element of "equitable
relief" available to employees since the 1972 Amendments. "Front pay" had
been used by Courts to "effectuate fully the make whole purposes of Title
Thus, it was used to make an employee "whole" when
VI." 114
reinstatement was not feasible or where litigation of the claim took so long
that plaintiff moved on to take other employment. In the Pollardcase, the
front pay award was $800,000 in addition to $107,364 in backpay and
benefits, $252,997 in attorneys' fees, and $300,000 in compensatory
damages (the maximum amount permitted under the § 198la(b)(3) cap).
Commentators noted than an $800,000 front pay award in this factual
context would not harm a large corporation like DuPont, but could have a
seriously negative impact on small businesses.1 15 On the other hand, front
pay may be the only way of making plaintiffs "whole" in situations where
Furthermore, the threat of
prompt reinstatement is not possible.
uncapped front pay is a strong "incentive not to let discriminatory acts
occur.""

6

In any event, the business community's only recourse now is to

7
lobby Congress to amend the Act."
Another Title VII case was on the Court's docket this term, and, in
another unanimous decision, the Court held that a single incident of
sexual harassment did not give rise to a Title VII claim. In Clark County
School District v. Breeden,"" the Court declared, per curiam, that sexual
harassment must be "severe and pervasive" to a degree that "create[s] an
abusive working environment" in order to create a Title VII claim." 9 A
'mere offensive utterance," like the one alleged in Breeden, was insufficient
and, "no reasonable person could have believed that the single incident [at
issue] ... violated Title VI's standard." 20 Breeden is a clear win for
business but hardly a path breaking case.
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care 121 was a case that raised the
issue of the proper deference owed agency interpretation. But it also
involved an issue of statutory construction. The dispute concerned a
determination as to whether nurses in a mental health facility were

113. Id.
114. Id. See Marcia Coyle, Damages Issue at High Court, 23 Natl. L.J. BI (Apr. 30, 2001);
Marcia Coyle, Pay Ruling Will Hurt Business, 23 Natl. L.J. Al (June 18, 2001) [hereinafter
Coyle, Pay Ruling].
115. See Coyle, Pay Ruling, supra n. 114, atAl.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001).
119. Id. at 1509 (citations and quotations omitted).
120. Id.
121. 121 S. Ct. 1861 (2001).
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"supervisors" pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").
"Supervisors" are not protected by the NLRA if "they exercise independent
judgment in directing the work of other employees on behalf of the
employer."122 The NLRB, by its Regional Director, ruled (1) that the health
care facility had the burden of proving that certain registered nurses
employed by the facility were "supervisors;" (2) that the facility failed to
meet its burden; and (3) that, therefore, the nurses should be included in
the bargaining unit for purposes of a union election.
The Court
unanimously agreed that the burden of proof falls on the party who asserts
that an employee is a "supervisor," but it split 5-4 on the issue of whether
the facility-employer met its burden. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia ruled that the NLRB exceeded its agency authority to interpret
arguably ambiguous provisions in the NLRA, because it inserted language
in the textual test for supervisor status when the text itself was not
ambiguous. However, the dissent opined that the Board's interpretation of
supervisory status was consistent with the Act, because the interpretation
limited the status "only [to] supervisory personnel vested with genuine
management prerogatives ... not straw bosses, lead man, set-up man and
other minor supervisory employees."'123 The case was a win for business
interests over union interests because it will expand the reach of the
supervisor exception in the NLRA.
In addition to Garrett, the Court decided two other ADA cases this
term. The more publicized of the two was, of course, PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin,12 4 where the Court, by a vote of 7-2, ruled that the protected class
under the ADA, "clients or customers," includes individuals (in this case,
golfers) who pay the organization (PGA) a fee in order to participate in
tournaments. Therefore, the plaintiff-golfer, was entitled to disability
accommodations as long as the accommodations did not "fundamentally
alter the nature" of the tournaments. The majority concluded that the
accommodation of permitting Casey Martin to ride in a motorized golf cart
while other contestants were required to walk the course was an
appropriate accommodation.125 Most commentators noted that this widely
publicized and hotly contested issue is limited to the facts of the case, and
therefore sui generis. Nevertheless, the case joins a line of cases that
demonstrates the ambiguities in a number of ADA provisions 26 and it

122. Id. at 1864 (citations and quotations omitted).
123. Id. at 1873 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.)
(arguing, among other things, that deference is owed agency interpretation when the
statutory language is ambiguous and finding that the Board's construction was consistent
with legislative intent).
124. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
125. Id. at 1894.
126. One of the major disputes in the Martin case, for example, was the proper
understanding of a place of "public accommodation" for purposes of TItle III of the Act.
One could reasonably argue that it is counter-intuitive to consider the PGA tournament a
place of public accommodation. Nevertheless, the issue has risen in other arenas where
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highlights the difficulty businesses
encounter in anticipating how the
127
ambiguities.
the
resolve
will
courts
An ADA case with much more far reaching consequences than Martin
was the Buckhannon case. In Buckhannon Board and Care v. West Virginia
Department. of Health and Human Services, 12 the question was what is a
"prevailing party" for purposes of federal fee-shifting statutes that reverse
the "American Rule" (each party bears its own costs of litigation) and
impose on the "losing party" in litigation not only its own costs and
attorneys fees but also those of the "prevailing party." At issue was the
"prevailing party" provision in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
("FHAA") and the ADA. An assisted living facility filed suit against the state
alleging that the state's "self-preservation" law violated the FHAA and the
ADA. But before the litigation was complete, the state changed the law,
eliminating the "self-preservation" provision. Buckhannon then fied for
"prevailing party" costs and fees under a "catalyst theory" which designates
a party as prevailing "if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit
brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct." 129 All
circuits that have considered the issue have adopted the "catalyst theory"
except the Fourth Circuit.130 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Buckhannon opted in favor of this distinctly minority position, holding that
"prevailing party" status is reached only when the desired change in the
defendant's conduct is achieved through some kind of court order so that
the change is enforceable by the Court. Examples cited by Chief Justice
Rehnquist include judgments on the merits and "settlement agreements
enforced through a consent decree."' 3' Relying on precedent for these
examples, the Chief Justice declared, "[tihese decisions, taken together,
establish that enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered
consent decrees create the 'material alteration' of the legal relationship of
32
the parties necessary to permit an award of [costs and] attorneys fees."1
the description of public seems vague. See e.g. Jankey v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 213 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
film studio is not a place of public accommodation, even though it admitted employee
guest); Stevens v. PremierCruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that shops
on cruise ships were places of public accommodation); Louie v. Ideal Cleaners, 1999 WL
1269191 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1999) (holding that a private bathroom in a business is not a
place of public accommodation). These cases were reported in Richard M. Goldstein &
Christopher J. Collier, Contentious Issues Emerge from Title III Cases, 23 Natil. L.J. B12
(Feb. 19, 2001). This article also points to other ambiguous, heavily litigated terms in Title
III: what does it mean to "fundamentally alter" the nature of an activity, service, or product;
who bears the burden of showing that a particular modification of accommodation is or is
not "readily achievable;" and so forth.
127. See Goldstein & Collier, supra n. 126, at B12 (recommending businesses survey their
facilities for barriers to use by patrons with disabilities and make modifications that are
not expensive and do not interfere with their business on their own).
128. 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1838 n. 3.
131. Id. at 1840.
132. Id.
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By contrast, he opined, "[a] defendant's voluntary change in conduct,
although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve
by the
33
change."
the
on
imprimatur
judicial
necessary
the
lacks
lawsuit,
This case, another 5-4 decision, is also another illustration of the
widening ideological gap on the Court and of the new battleground where it
finds expression, statutory interpretation (formerly the locus for narrow
consensus-building decisions). In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer made three principal points. First,
that the majority's decision reverses a longstanding interpretation of the
prevailing party statutes."' Second, that the consequences of the new rule
will be to deny court access to private litigants seeking to enforce federal
law and it will thereby weaken the leverage against misconduct that
Congress intended the fee-shifting statutes to have. And, third, that the
Chief Justice's opinion is not supported by any of the traditional rules of
statutory construction. Whatever its merits, this decision is surely to be
counted as a win for the business community. Its ramifications in society
could be quite large because it implicates all federal statutes with feeshifting provisions. Inside the narrower universe of Court-watchers, it will
undoubtedly be remembered as a case of broad ideological proportions
achieved on narrow technical grounds. In many respects, Buckhannon is
one of the most important cases this term. Its undoubtedly far-reaching
consequences have yet to be assessed.
The final labor and employment case, Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers,
Inc., 135a
unanimous decision, ruled that a California statute, which
authorized the state to withhold monies owed contractors on a public
works project if a subcontractor violates certain provisions of the state
labor code, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 6 Even though the law entitled the state to withhold the
monies, without notice and the opportunity to be heard, and even though
the monies represented a protected property interest of the contractor,
there was no constitutional violation because the state code permits the
contractor or his assignee, subcontractor to sue.
"We hold that if
California makes ordinary judicial process available to respondent for
resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due process. " 13 7 There
can be no question that this result represents a loss for the construction
industry in California.

133. Id.
134. According to the dissent, the Court "upsets long prevailing Circuit precedent
applicable to scores of federal fee-shifting statutes." Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1850
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. 121 S. Ct. 1446 (2001).
136. Id. at 1451.
137. Id.
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TAXATION

The Court decided several interesting tax cases this term. In United
Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 138 the Court decided, with only
139
one dissenting opinion, that the "net operating loss" ("NOL") provision of
the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") could be applied in the aggregate to an
affiliated group of corporations that filed consolidated tax returns, thus
entitling the group to a ten-year carryback for product liability loss
("PLL").4° This, in spite of the fact that some of the individual corporations
income. 141
in the group with product liability expenses had positive taxable
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, explained that section 1501 of the
Code, and the Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder, permit
affiliated groups of corporations to file a consolidated group's taxable
income ("CTI") and its operating loss ("CNOL") must take into account the
individual taxable income ("ST) of each corporate member but disregard
certain items (capital gains and losses, dividend and charitable deductions)
which are aggregated as a group calculation). 142 Using section 1501 and
its accompanying regulations, the consolidated group aggregated its
members' product liability expenses ("PLEs") and, because they were
exceeded by the aggregate operating losses of the group, concluded it could
treat the PLEs as PLLs, thus entitling the group to the ten-year
carryback. 143 The govenment responded that an affiliate with a positive
taxable income in a given year could not contribute its PLEs to the
44
The
aggregate PLL. This is known as the "single entity" approach.
government argued, among other things, that its interpretation of section
1501 was justified by the fact that PLEs were not included in the items to
be disregarded in calculating a separate entity's taxable income but
45
aggregated with the group's ("expressio unius est exclusio alterius).1 But
the Court rejected that rule of statutory construction as inappropriate in
this context. It declared that if Treasury "could not live with [the Court's
46
interpretation]" it was free to amend its regulations accordingly.'
The decision, while a "win" for the business group in the lawsuit, was
not necessarily a "windfall" for business, generally. In response to the
government's argument that the decision opens the door to "significant tax
avoidance abuses," the Court reminded the government that neither the

138. 121 S. Ct. 1934 (2001).
139. 26 U.S.C. § 172(c) (1994).
140. 26 U.S.C. § 172(b)(1)(1) (1994). PLL is "the lesser of (1) the taxpayer's net operating
loss for such year and (2) its allowable deductions attributable to product liability
expenses." UnitedDominion, 121 S. Ct. at 1937.
141. United Dominion, 121 S. Ct. at 1937.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1938.
144. Id. at 1942.
145. Id. at 1943.
146. Id.
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separate member approach of the government nor the single-entity
treatment adopted by the Court is a panacea for tax avoidance. And, in
any case, the Code at section 269 gives the government authority to
sanction tax 1avoidance
behavior, by disallowing deductions and credits at
47
its discretion.
In Gitlitz v. Commissionerof Internal Revenue,148 the Court again, over
one dissent, ruled in favor of taxpayers (Sub S corporation shareholders).
Subchapter S's "pass-through" treatment 49 includes discharged debt as an
item of income that passes through to shareholder. 150 In this case,
shareholders of an insolvent Sub S corporation, included the discharge on
a ratable basis of indebtedness excluded as gross income by the
corporation. 15 ' The inclusion increased their individual bases in the
corporation, thereby permitting them to pass through and deduct, pro rata,
the full amount of the corporation's losses. 5 2 Based on traditional rules of
statutory construction, and especially the plain meaning rule, the Court
concluded the tax-payers/shareholders were entitled to the tax treatment
they claimed.
United States v. Cleveland Indians BaseballCompany' 5 3 posed another
statutory construction issue. This time with regard to back wage
provisions in two federal statutes. With one concurrence, a unanimous
Court held that Federal Insurance Contribution Act ("FICA7) and Federal
Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA) taxes should be calculated according to
the year in which wages are actually paid, rather than the year they should
have been paid. 's4 In so ruling, it deferred to the Internal Revenue
Service's statutory interpretation of the applicable sections finding it to be
"reasonable, consistent and longstanding." 5 5 To the extent that the case
clarifies the issue and lends uniformity and predictability to tax
calculations on back wages, the case must be seen as a win for business.
Two other taxes cases of more limited application were decided this
term. In Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. v. Shirley,5 6 the Court revisited
the general rule set forth in Montana v. United States, that Native American
tribes do not have legal authority over non-tribe members on non-Indian

147. United Dominion, 121 S. Ct. at 1943 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 269(a) (1994)).
148. 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
149. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1)(A) (1994).
150. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 61(a)(12) (1994), 108(a) (1994).
151. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 209-10 (pursuant to § 108(a)).
152. Id. (Pursuant to § 1366(d)(1), a shareholder's pass-through of company losses cannot
exceed her basis in the stock and debt of the corporation. By including the discharge of
debt, the shareholders increased their bases and, therefore, the amount of debt they were
entitled to deduct.).
153. 121 S. Ct. 1433 (2001).
154. Id. at 1436.
155. Id.
156. 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001).
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fee land within the reservation.15 7 This rule is derived from the limited
jurisdiction tribes are deemed to have: "Iflor powers not expressly conferred
them by federal statute or treaty, Indian tribes must rely on their retained
or inherent sovereignty." 5 8 There are two exceptions to the Montana rule:
(1) "A tribe may regulate through taxation, licensing or other means, the
activities of non-members who enter consensual (commercial) relationships
with the tribe. . ." and (2) "a tribe may... exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians... when the conduct threatens... the political
integrity, the economic security or the health or welfare of the tribe." 5 9 In
the instant case, the tribe sought to impose a tax on a nonmember owner
60
of a hotel located on non-Indian fee land within the tribal reservation.
The attempted taxation did not fall within either exception; therefore
the
161
tribe lacked authority to impose the tax under the Montana rule.
Finally, in Drector of Revenue of Missouri v. CoBank ACB, 162 a
unanimous Court ruled that the federally-chartered National Bank for
Cooperatives (and its successor) was not exempt from state income
taxation. The result was derived from the Court's interpretation of the
Farm Credit Act. The Bank had argued that, because the current version
of the Act is silent on the issue, the federal government and its
instrumentality had not waived their immunity from state taxation;
therefore the Bank was exempt.' 6 But the Court ruled that even though
the current version of the Act is silent on the issue of state tax exemption,
earlier versions expressly stated the institutions were not immune from
state taxation.1'4 Furthermore, the applicable sections were eliminated by
"technical and conforming amendments" in the 1985 Act.' 65 The technical
nature of these amendments, said the Court, is insufficient evidence of
Congressional intent to make a substantial change in the Act on the issue
of state tax immunity. 6 6 In a narrow field of law, on a narrow statutory
issue, this case is a loss for the banking industry.
VI.

SECURITIES REGULATION

In the only securities law case on the Court's docket this term, the
Court unanimously held that a stock option in a cable television system

157. Id. at 1828-29 (citing Mont v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
158. Id at 1830.
159. Id. at 1830-31 (quoting Mont., 450 U.S. at 565-66).
160. The hotel was located on land directly purchased from the United States by a nonIndian but the land was part of a parcel later added to the reservation by federal law. Id. at
1829.
161. Id.
162. 531 U.S. 316 (2001).
163. Id. at 319 (citing McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316 (1819), for its Supremacy Clause
argument).
164. Id. at 324 (citing the Farm Credit Act of 1933).
165. Id.
166. Id
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was a "security" pursuant to section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule lOb-5; therefore a sale of the option with the undisclosed
intent not to honor its terms violated Rule lOb-5. The case, The Wharf
(Holdings), Ltd. v. United International Holdings, Inc. 167 involved a
straightforward application of the statute's plain meaning to the facts in
the case. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act "prohibits using any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security"' 68 and section 78c(a)(10) of Title 15 of the United States
Code defines security to include "both any... option... on any security
and any... right to... purchase stock." 169 The Court found defendant's
argument, that the 1934 Act does not cover oral agreements, 170
unpersuasive and it also rejected the defendant's argument that fraud was
inapplicable to the facts in the case. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
"prohibits using any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in
7
1
security."'
any
of
sale
or
purchase
the
with
connection
VII.

COPYRIGHT, PATENT AND TRADEMARK

Three intellectual property cases made their way to this term's docket.
Of the three, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 172 is by far
the most consequential and far-reaching, adding to the body of case law
describing and circumscribing trade dress protection. Last term, the Court
held in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.,173 that unregistered
trade dress (such as clothing design) is protected from infringement under
the Lanham Act only if it has acquired "secondary meaning" in the minds
of the public, so that the design, itself, identifies its source. In so ruling,
the Court did away with the "inherently distinctive test" which was much
easier to prove and the Court, in Wal-Mart, made it clear that it was
intentionally limiting the reach of trade dress protections with this more
rigid test. Following the imposition of Wal-Mart's new "secondary meaning"
test, litigants have had a much more difficult time garnering trade dress
protection. 74 The negative impact of the "secondary meaning" tests on

167. 121 S. Ct. 1776 (2001).
168. Id. at 1778 (citations and quotations omitted).
169. Id. at 1780 (citations and quotations omitted).
170. Id. at 1781.
171. Id. at 1782.
172. 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001).
173. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
174. See William D. Coston & Martin L. Saad, Boundaries of Trade Dress May Soon Be
Realigned, 23 Natl. L.J. C8 (Feb. 5, 2001) (citing several cases where lower courts, following
Wal-Mart, denied trade-dress protection under the more stringent "secondary meaning"
test: Don Post Studios, Inc. v. Cinema Secrets, Inc., No. 99-5731, 2000 U.S. Dist. Leids
17403 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 1, 2000) (no secondary meaning for Halloween mask); Bretford Mfg.,
Inc. v. Smith System Mfg. Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (no secondary meaning
for V-shaped desk legs); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 140
(D. Mass. 2000) (no secondary meaning for candles); DiamondDirectL.L.C. v. Star Diamond
Group, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (no secondary meaning for jewelry
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trade dress claims contrasts sharply with the successful use made of the
"inherently distinctive" test that it replaced. 7 5 Ever since the Supreme
Court's decision in 1992, Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana,Inc.,17 6 product
designers had used the latter test to achieve protection of allegedly
distinctive packaging of the products, even though protection was probably
not available under patent law alone.17 7 The effect of Two Pesos, the Court
believed, was that "expansive trade dress protection disrupted the careful
balance between innovation and competition, a balance found in the
constitutionally-based U.S. patent laws."'7 8 Wal-Mart made a concerted
effort to right the balance by ratcheting up the requirements for proving
entitlement to trade dress protection. This term, the Court continued that
effort in TrafFix by holding, unanimously, that where the subject-matter of
the trade dress protection suit is also covered by an (in this case) expired
utility patent, claimant has the burden of proving that the trade dress is
not functional. 79 The burden is a heavy one, given that there are over "600
million functional features claimed in the U.S. patent database." 180 While
trade dress remains protected by federal law,18 1 the Court is quite clearly
attempting to make its protection more difficult to obtain and thereby to
rebalance the interests of the producer with those of the public and we can
anticipate more trade dress cases will make their way to the Court, as the
Court reconfigures its trade dress doctrine.
The Court also addressed a copyright issue, holding 7-2, in New York
Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 82 that the Copyright Act did not confer on
publishers the right to reproduce, on the , copies of articles for which the
publishers had originally received only a copyright for publication in print
periodicals. At issue was section 201(c) of the Act which states that
copyright of an individual article vests in the author and is to be
distinguished from the copyright on the collective work in which the article
appears. Further, the holder of the "copyright in the collective work is
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and
distributing the individual work as a part of that collective [and] any
revision of [or] ...later collective... in the same series." 83 The publishers

designs); McKeman v. Burek, 118 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Mass. 2000) (no secondary meaning
for bumper stickers)).
175. Id.
176. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
177. Cotson & Saad, supran. 174, at C8.
178. Id.
179. TraJFizx 121 S.Ct. at 1259-60.
180. Vincent P. Tassinarl, Held up by "TrajF,"23 Natl. L.J. C1 (Apr. 30, 2001).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994). This section of the Lanham Act gives a cause of
action to one who is injured when a person uses "any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof... which is likely to cause confusion... as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods." Id.; TraJFYY4 121 S.Ct. at 1259.
182. 121 S.Ct. 2381 (2001).
183. Id. at 2388-89.
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argued that reproducing individual articles from a print collective in
databases on the Internet is merely a "revision" of the collective and falls
within the purview of section 201(c). The District Court agreed, reasoning
that "[tlo qualify as revisions.., works need only preserve some original
aspect of [collective works] ....
[and] [tihis criterion was met... because
the Databases preserved the Print Publishers selection of articles by
copying all of the articles originally assembled in the periodicals' daily or
weekly issues. 18 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that
the transfer of the articles to the databases was not merely a "revision" but,
because the articles were individually retrievable by individual users of the
databases, "the Databases might fairly be described as containing new
antholog[ies] of innumerable editions or publications... which would not
be protected against charges of infringement of the authors' individual
copyrights under 201(c)."18 5 A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with
the Second Circuit, adding that the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, (of
which section 201 is a part), was expressly designed to protect the
copyrights of individual authors as against those of the publisher and that
section 201 should be read with that purpose in mind:
Essentially, § 201(c) adjusts a publisher's copyright in its collective work
to accommodate a freelancer's copyright in her contribution. If there is a
demand for a freelance article standing alone or in a new collection, the
Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that demand; after
authorizing initial publication the freelancer may also sell the article to
others.,8 6
Under the facts in this case, explained the majority, the individual
articles that first appeared in the print collective are individually accessed
through search engines, appear "as a separate item within the search
result" and may appear without the graphics, formatting, or other articles
with which the articles were initially published." Hence, they are neither
"revisions" nor "part of' the original collective, but "individual articles
presented individually."18 7 The dissent agreed with the district court's
analysis and argued that the majority decision made a distinction without
articulating a difference. It argued that transferring the print collectives to
databases could be seen as a "revision" and that that interpretation of
section 201 was entirely consonant with the purposes of the 1976 Act to
protect the copyright interests of individual authors:
[NJeither the publication of the collective works by the Print Publishers,
nor their transfer to the Electronic Databases had any impact on the legal
status of the copyrights of the respondents' individual contributions [only
the individual authors] ... could authorize the publication of their articles

184.
185.
186.
187.

1& at 2386-87.
Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 167-70 (2d Cir. 1999).
Tasin, 121 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (citations omitted).
Id. at2391.
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188

While both textual interpretations of section 201 are reasonable, the
difficulty of resolving this issue lies, as both the majority and dissent point
out, beyond the purview of statutory interpretation: to public policy and
Congress. Congress has the ultimate responsibility of reassessing the Act
in light of the sea changes wrought in the universe of intellectual property
rights by information technology. Both the majority and the dissent
conceded that in drafting section 201(c) the members of Congress did not
consider the questions posed by the case. Thus, in both intellectual
property cases this term, the Court was asked to address the meaning of
statutory provisions in the context of a rapidly changing societal
environment but Tasini creates a much more difficult challenge than
TraJFixbecause both the words of the text and the public policy they were
intended to effectuate seem outdated and out-of-step with the information
technologies revolution. Therefore, without a reassessment by Congress of
policy and law in light of that revolution, Supreme Court decisions on these
issues will be inconclusive and tenuous. The Third Branch is ill-equipped
to develop law under these circumstances.
VIII. PROPERLY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The Court split ideologically on an important eminent domain case,
which adds to the Court's "takings" jurisprudence. At issue in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island 89 was an eighteen-acre tract consisting of coastal wetlands
and a parcel of uplands. The landowner wanted to fill the land and
construct a beach club on the wetland site. The Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Council ("Council") denied his application,
pursuant to its wetlands regulations. The landowner filed an inverse
condemnation suit in state court, arguing that the Council's actions
violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 0 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy declared that landowner's claim was ripe; and that his
purchase of the tract after the applicable regulations were enacted did not
bar his claims. Building on an earlier decision 9 ' and distinguishing Lucas
v. South Carolina Costal Council,192 the Court declared, "lilt would be
illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the postenactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the

188. Id. at 2396 n. 6 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
190. Id. at 2451.
191. Nollan v. Cal. CoastalCommn., 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
192. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (holding that a land owner's takings claim is subjected
to "restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership.").
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claim ripe were not taken... by a previous owner. " 19 3 Having dispensed
with these threshold hurdles, the Court addressed the merits of the takings
claim, which the Court declared must fail. The landowner argued the
council's ruling created a total deprivation of the enjoyment and value of
his property. Since the State had persuasively shown that the uplands
portion of his property could be developed, he was not deprived of all
economically beneficial uses of his tract.1 94 And, as has been the case
generally with the Court's takings decisions, the 5-4 split represented a
difference of opinion as to how to balance the rights of the owner with
those of the public at large: contemporary interests and those of future
generations.1 9 But there was also a great deal of discussion in both the
concurring and dissenting opinions about the doctrinal confusion
Palazzolo may create, especially with regard to determining at what point a
taking has occurred.196
Another 5-4 vote split emerged in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers197 where the justices
debated the definition of "navigable water" pursuant to the Clean Water Act
("Act"). Section 404(a) of the Act gives the Army Corps authority to issue
permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into .... navigable
waters.. . ."1' "Navigable waters" is defined at section 1362(7) of the Act
as "'waters of the United States.'" 99 The Corps has interpreted waters of
the United States to include "intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sand fiats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate... commerce. "2°° And in
1986, the Corps added a "Migratory Bird Rule" describing its 404(a) permit
authority to include "intrastate waters" if they serve as habitants for birds
protected by the Migratory Bird Treaties, or for migratory birds that cross
state lines, or for endangered species or if the waters are used "to irrigate
crops sold in interstate commerce." 20 1 In the instant case, the Corps
invoked this authority to deny a discharge permit at abandoned sand and
20 2
gravel pits on the grounds that it was a habitat for migratory birds.
Permit applicant challenged both the authority of the Corps in this context

193. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463.
194. Id. at 2464-65. The Court expressly refused to discuss the fine points of an
argument that could have been raised (and had been raised in other cases): at what point
does a fractional economically beneficial use become so small as to amount to a taking. I&195. See id. at 2472 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
196. See id. at 2468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
197. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
198. Id. at 678 (citations and quotations omitted).
199. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
200. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
201. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
202. Id.
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and the merits of its denial of the permit.20 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, agreed with the applicant that the Migratory Bird
Rule was not authorized by Congress and struck it down. In so doing he
distinguished the Court's precedent, United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes,2° 4 explaining that in that case the wetlands at issue "abutted... a
navigable waterway, and, therefore, the Corps was entitled to agency
deference pursuant to Chevron."20 5 He also refuted the Corps' argument
that Congress had acquiesced in the Corps' Migratory Bird Rule.
Rehnquist declined to view Congressional refusal to limit the Corps'
jurisdiction in 1977 as adequate proof of Congressional acquiescence in
206
the 1985 Rule.
He also suggested that because the Migratory Bird Rule
tests the reach of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, the Court
would require a more explicit indication that Congress intended to assert
its Commerce Clause jurisdiction to the extent claimed by the Rule. In
other words, he intimated that clear evidence that Congress intended the
jurisdictional reach of the Migratory Bird Rule would shift the analysis to
Federalism: to an inquiry as to whether the Rule exceeds the jurisdictional
limits of the Commerce Clause.20 7 The four dissenting justices took issue
with the majority opinion, finding the Migratory Bird Rule well within the
three categories of Congressional Commerce Clause authority as they had
already been articulated in the Lopez case;20 8 and declaring that the Court
had previously found Congressional acquiescence in the Corps'
interpretation of Commerce Clause jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview
Homes:
Moreover, once Congress crossed the legal watershed that separates
navigable streams of commerce from marshes and inland lakes, there is no
principled reason for limiting the statute's protection to those waters or
wetlands that happen to lie near a navigable stream. 0 9
Therefore, concluded the dissent, the Corps' Migratory Bird Rule was
entitled to Chevron deference.210
The Court also heard a Clean Air Act ("CAA") case this term and
resolved it on much less contentious grounds.
With no dissenting
2 11
opinions, the Court, in Whitman v. American Tmucking Associations

203. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 678.
204. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
205. Riverside,531 U.S. at 167.
206. Id. at 169-70 ("[F]ailed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on
which to rest an interpretation of a poor statute") (citations and quotations omitted).
207. Id. at 173.
208. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (stating
that Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce Congress, and that the Migratory Bird Rule passes constitutional muster under
Lopez's analytical framework).
209. Id. at 173.
210. Id. at 191.
211. 531 U.S. 457 (2000).
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rejected industry arguments that the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") final rules revising national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") for ozone and particulate matter (or soot) should include
considerations of the cost of implementation. In an opinion authored by
Justice Scalia, the Court ruled that the EPA is limited to public health and
safety considerations by the CAA and may not temper those considerations
with cost-benefit considerations.2 12 In the other major ruling in the case,
Scalia declared that Congressional delegation to the EPA to set NAAQS was
213
not unconstitutional.
Commentators agree that the importance of the
case lies in the fact that the trucking industry, in this case, mounted what
many consider to be "one of the most powerful judicial attacks since the
"2 4
1
New Deal on the legal foundations of the modem administrative state.
That attack was decisively defeated not only in Whitman but in an
analogous case in which the Court denied certiorari: the week after
Whitman was decided. In that case, the Court rejected challenges to new
EPA regulations that required significant reductions in ozone emission
from power plants. The effect of the denial of writ of certiorariis to allow
enforcement of those rules to proceed in 2004.215 These cases represent
important losses for industries affected by the new regulations. However,
on balance, business remains in a relatively strong position under the
Court's previously established property and environmental law doctrines.
IX.

ADMIRALTY, MARITIME, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

The Court's rulings on global trade-related issues were largely reached
by consensus. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.2 16 juxtaposed the
savings clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 with the Limitation of Liability
Act of 185 1.217 The savings clause is an exception to exclusive federal
jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases and allows for some state law
claims. 2 18 The Liability Act permits ship owners to limit their liability for
damage or injury to the value of the owners' interest in the vessel.21 9 In
Lewis, an injured seaman invoked the savings clause to sue in state court
for injuries he received on the vessel of his employer. The employer sued in
federal court under the Liability Act to enjoin the state suit. The question
for the Court was whether the federal court abused its discretion in

212. Id. at 464-70.
213. Id. at472.
214. Linda Greenhouse, E.P.A.'s Authority on Air Rules Wins Supreme Court's Backing,
N.Y. Times Al (Feb. 28, 2001).
215. Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A. 121 S. Ct. 1225 (2001), cited in Linda Greenhouse,
Court to Consider Right to Sue Company Running Halfway House for FederalAgency, N.Y.
Times A17 (Mar. 6, 2001).
216. 531 U.S. 438 (2001).
217. Id- at 444.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 441.
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granting the sailor's motion to dissolve the injunction so that he could
proceed with his state court action.220 Relying on precedent, the Court
agreed that the federal court properly exercised its discretion by dissolving
the injunction. 221
In Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris,2 2 2 the Court

construed federal maritime law to permit a wrongful death action by
extending its precedent, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,223 to permit
not only a tort action premised on the issue of vessel sea worthiness but
also a tort action for negligence. 2224 Given the rule enunciated in Moragne:
"We... hold that an action does lie under general maritime duties,"225 and
the fact that the development of maritime law has recognized the tort of
negligence for more than a century, the Court saw no reason for barring
the wrongful death action.2 26
United States v. Mead Corporation227 was a tariff classification case.
Over one dissent, the Court ruled that a Chevron-type deference to the
agency's classification was not appropriate where, as in Mead, it appeared
that Congress had not intended to delegate rulemaking to the United
States Customs Service to prescribe tariff classifications. Nevertheless,
while Customs' letter ruling classifications are not strictly entitled to
Chevron's binding deference that does not mean they are not entitled to
any judicial deference. In dissent, Scalia charged that the Court had
significantly weakened the mandates of Chevron. But, clearly, because
agency determinations can cut either way for business interests, Mead and
the other international trade cases this term have no significant impact on
the business community.
X.

FEDERAL STATUTES

Last term the Court considered the provisions of The Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") in two cases. 228 This
term the Court reviewed and clarified RICO's provisions again. This time,
the disputed language was found in section 1962(c), making it unlawful for
"[any person employed by or associated with any enterprise... to conduct
or participate ...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs... in the

220. Id221. I. at 451.
222. 121 S. Ct 1927 (2001).
223. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
224. Norfolk, 121 S. Ct. at 1933.
225. Id. at 1930 (citations and quotations omitted).
226. Id. at 1933.
227. 121 S. CL 2164 (2001).
228. Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000) (holding that termination for refusal to
participate in alleged racketeering activity is not an injury caused by RICO) and Rotella v.
Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) (holding that RICO's 4-year statute of limitations is not tolled
by injury and pattern discovery rule).
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commission of a pattern of racketeering activity."229 Courts typically call
this provision the "distinctness rule."
When a boxing promotions
corporation sued another promoter, alleging that he engaged in
racketeering activity, the question was whether an individual ("any person
employed") could be distinguished analytically from his corporation ("any
enterprise") if, as here, he was both president and sole shareholder of the
closely-held enterprise. Invoking traditional principles of corporate law, a
unanimous court in Cedric Kusher PromotionsLtd. v. Don King2 ° ruled that
he could. Conceding that plaintiff in a RICO suit must allege and prove
these two separate entities, a person and an enterprise, the Court went on
to find that here, the "distinctness" rule was met by the conceptual
framework of traditional corporate law. "After all, incorporation's basic
purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with rights, obligations, powers,
and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it,
who own it, or whom it employs."231
In Central Green Co. v. United States232 the Court considered the
proper construction of certain provisions of the Flood Control Act of 1928.
The case arose when a farm owner alleged that a federal irrigation canal
that flowed through his property was negligently designed. When it
overflowed and flooded his land, he sued the federal government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. But the federal government claimed that it was
immune from suit and that its immunity derived from the Flood Control
Act. The relevant text of the Act reads, "No liability of any kind shall attach
to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood
waters at any place. " 23 3 A unanimous Court decided that a determination
as to whether water in the canal were "flood waters" required the lower
court to develop the record on whether the waters that flooded the canal
were actually occasioned by flood, on the one hand, or by irrigation
projects or electricity generation projects on the other. The fact that the
canal itself was part of a flood control system was not relevant. "[Tihe
scope of the immunity... [is determined] ... not by the character of the
federal project but by the character of the waters that caused the...
damage and the purposes behind their release." The case was reversed
and remanded.23 4
In a major victory for the medical equipment industry, the Court
unanimously dismissed a "fraud-on-the FDA" claim. The state law claim
was brought in Buckman Company v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee 35 alleging
that orthopedic bone screws which injured a patient's spine in which they
229.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994).

230.

121 S. Ct. 2087 (2001).

231.

Id. at 2091.

232.

531 U.S. 425 (2001).

233. 33 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
234. CentraIGreen, 531 U.S. at 434.
235. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
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were implanted, gained FDA approval through fraudulent representations
by their manufacturer. The Court took a close look at the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA) and found that while the FDCA might not
expressly preempt state law claims, like the ones at issue, these claims
would conflict both with the FDA's authority to punish fraud and with its
objective of achieving "a somewhat delicate balance of statutory
objectives." 6 The statutory framework of the FDCA, said the Court,
directs the agency both to insure that medical devices that reach the
market are reasonably safe and effective and, simultaneously, to insure
that if they are, they reach the market at an early date. State law actions
could upset the mandated statutory balance
and, therefore, said the Court,
7
federal law impliedly preempts them.2
While the case was obviously an important win for the medical device
industry, the preemption holding in the case was narrowly constrained to
that industry and to the FDCA and, therefore, adds nothing of broader
significance to the Court's developing preemption doctrine.238
Finally, in an interesting challenge to the Mushroom Promotion,
Research and Consumer Information Act, the Court decided that a
mandatory fee assessed against mushroom producers violated their First
Amendment rights. The case, United States v. UnitedFoods,2 9 involved the
issue of compelled commercial speech. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, began his analysis by noting that while commercial speech is
entitled to some First Amendment protection, it is generally not entitled to
the same degree of protection accorded other speech. Identifying Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.240 and
CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 24' as the seminal cases establishing the framework for commercial
speech doctrine, he went on to add that, under the facts of this case, the
compelled speech was constitutionally impermissible. At issue was a
provision in the Act imposing a mandatory assessment on "all handlers of
fresh mushrooms in an amount not to exceed one cent per pound of
mushrooms produced or imported."242 The assessment was used primarily
"for generic advertising to promote mushroom sales."243 United Foods, a
large producer and distributor of foodstuffs including mushrooms, objected
to the statutory assessment on the grounds that it compelled speech with
which United Foods strenuously disagreed. United Foods contended that

236. Id. at 348.
237. Id. at 347-46.
238. See e.g. Marcia Coyle, Big Winfor Big Business, 23 Natl. L.J. BI (Mar. 5, 2001).
239. 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001). 240. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech is protected by First Amendment).
241. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (setting forth test which offers commercial speech less
protection than other speech).
242. United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2337.
243. Id.
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its own brand of mushrooms was superior to those of competitors. But the
assessment supported an advertising "message that [all] mushrooms are
worth consuming whether or not they are branded." 24 4 Agreeing with
United Foods, the Court concluded that the statutory assessment
impermissibly infringed on its First Amendment rights. In so doing the
Court was careful to distinguish the facially similar facts in Glickman v.
Wileman Bros & Elliott,Inc.,2 5 where the Court reached the opposite result.
In Glickman, the Court found that a statutory assessment imposed on
producers of California tree fruit for generic advertising did not violate the
producers' First Amendment rights because the assessment was part of a
"comprehensive statutory marketing program for the produce. " 24
Of
pivotal importance, said the Court, the program "displaced many aspects of
independent business activity.., the program was characterized by
[ciollective action, rather than the aggregate consequences of independent
choices.' 247 By contrast, the statutory program in United Foods did not
establish a comprehensive program. "Mushroom producers are not forced
to associate as a group which makes cooperative decisions. [With the
exception of the mandatory assessment].., the mushroom growing
business... is unregulated.
,,248 Therefore, the mushroom producers
249
were distinguishable from groups, like the California tree fruit producers
or like attorneys in a state bar association,25 ° who may be compelled to pay
fees in support of the association's mission. Without a comprehensive
associational scheme, which the fee assessment serves, the mandatory fees
constitute compelled speech, which violates First Amendment rights.
However, a dissenting opinion took issue with Justice Kennedy's attempt to
find a principled way of distinguishing United Foods from Glickman and its
antecedents.
First, said the dissent, like Glickman, the mandatory
assessment in the instant case was merely a part of an economic
regulatory scheme devised by Congress. "[TIhe advertising here relates
directly... to the regulatory program's underlying goal of maintainfing]
and expand[ing] existing markets and uses for mushrooms."25 1 Hence, like
the fees in Glickman, the assessments should have been viewed as "nothing
more than additional economic regulation, which did not raise First
244. Id. at 2338.
245. Id. at 2337-38.
246. Id at 2336.
247. Id. at 2339 (citations and quotations omitted).
248. United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2359 (citations and quotations omitted).
249. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
250. Keller v. State Bar of CaL, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (approving, in part, imposition of bar
association fees as long as they were used to support the mission of the association).
However, as the Court has noted, "objecting members were not required to give speech
subsidies for matters not germane to the larger regulatory purpose which justified the
required association." United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2340. The Court also cited the seminal
case on this issue, Abood v. DetroitBd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
251. United Foods, 121 S. Ct. at 2344 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined in parts I, III by
Ginsberg & O'Connor, JJ.).
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Amendment concerns."25 2 The dissent found the First Amendment
precedent cited by the majority to be inapposite, because those cases
involved political speech; speech about beliefs. In the instant case, the
253
Thus, the
assessment was merely "a species of economic regulation."
mandatory assessment did not trigger First Amendment analysis. "It does
not significantly interfere with protected speech interest," "it does not
compel speech itself;" it furthers, rather than hinders, the basic First
Amendment 'commercial speech' objective.., the free flow of truthful
commercial information;" [and it presents] ... no special risk of other
forms of speech-related harm. But perhaps the most incisive critique by
the dissent was its declaration that the Court's analysis in United Foods
conflates economic regulation with free speech doctrine to such a degree
that it calls into question any number of statutory regulations. As
examples, the dissent mentions assessments against tobacco companies
for advertising the dangers of smoking and the imposition of entry fees at
museums to be used to advertise the value of art to society.2 s4 Given the
analysis in United Foods, it is difficult to predict how the Court might
handle these questions. The legacy of the majority opinion in United Foods
may be increased doctrinal uncertainty, rather than enhanced doctrinal

clarity.
XI. CIVL PRACTICE
Finally, several civil practice decisions that impact business litigation
should be mentioned. In Becker v. Montgomery,25 5 a unanimous Court
gave litigants some procedural latitude, ruling that failure to sign a notice
of appeal in federal court violated federal rules but the violation was
curable, because it did not involve a jurisdictional issue. Consequently,
the Court did not mandate dismissal of the case. 25 6 In New Hampshire v.
Maine 5 7 the Court ruled that the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel was
properly invoked by a lower court that held that a litigant state (New
Hampshire) was barred from asserting a position contrary to its position in
early litigation. The Court reiterated the rule that "where a party assumes
a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that
position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed,
assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party
2
In the New
who acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him." 58
Hampshire case, the Court expressly refused to hear Maine's contentions

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 2340.
Id. at 2346 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2347.
121 S. Ct. 1801 (2001).
Id. at 1807.
121 S. Ct. 1808 (2001).
Id at 1814 (citations and quotations omitted).
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on "the res judicata doctrines called claim and issue preclusion," finding
judicial estoppel a better fit with the facts in that case. 25 9 But in Semtek
InternationalInc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp,260 the Court addressed the claim
preclusive effect of a judgment and unanimously concluded that the effect
of the judgment (in this case a dismissal premised on Califomia's statute of
limitations) in a diversity case subsequently brought on the same issues in
Maryland was, pursuant to federal rules pertaining to diversity cases,
governed by the applicable res judicata rule in the state where the diversity
action was brought. On that basis, the case was remanded to the federal
district court. In an interesting if somewhat counter-intuitive opinion,
Justice Scalia (no fan of federal common law generally) wrote on behalf of
the Court that the issue was governed by federal common law rules.
Applying federal common law, Scalia found that in a diversity case the
26 1
rules of the forum state apply.
Finally in one of the most important business-related cases this term,
the Court considered the proper standard for review of a punitive damages
award. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,262 the
losing defendant in a suit alleging trade dress infringement and false
advertising, "passing off" and unfair competition challenged the jury award
of $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive
damages. Specifically, the defendant corporation charged that the punitive
damage award was so excessive that it violated the defendant's
Constitutional rights. Thus, the case raised one of the most important
issues for business interests this term: to what extent can (or must) higher
courts monitor what businesses accurately describe as the always
unpredictable and occasionally excessive arena of punitive awards? In
CooperIndustries, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's findings
that the punitive damages were reasonable under the facts by applying an
abuse of discretion standard. The defendant appealed arguing, among
other things, that the proper standard of review was de novo. Thus, the
battle lines were clearly drawn. The plaintiff argued that the standard of
review of jury awards is properly premised on a factual analysis, hence
deference to the trial court and the finder of fact is in order and the
appropriate standard is the relatively deferential abuse of discretion
standard. Weighing in on the other side of the theoretical divide, defendant
and business interests like the United States Chamber of Commerce
argued that the standard of review of jury awards is properly premised on
an "inquiry" into "legal principles," hence de novo review is the proper

259. Id.
260. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
261. For a thorough discussion of the ramifications of Justice Scalia's opinion, see
Georgene Vairo, Forum Selection: PreclusionPriorities,23 NatI. L.J. A12 (May 7. 2001).
262. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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standard.26 And, each side drew on a different line of antecedent case law
to support their respective positions. Plaintiff and its amici pointed to the
1996 case of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,264 where the Court
analyzed compensatory damages under the Seventh Amendment and ruled
that in reviewing a jury award of allegedly excessive compensatory
damages, the proper standard of review was abuse of discretion. While
defendant and the amicus business interests pointed to the 1996 case of
BMW v. Gore, 265 where the Court reviewed de novo an allegedly excessive
punitive damage award and found it violative of defendant's Due Process
rights. The specific questions addressed to the Supreme Court were: (1)
whether the Court of Appeals' abuse of discretion standard was the proper
standard of review, and (2) if it was not, then did the appellate court's
affirmance of the jury award violate the standards set forth in Gore.
Resolving a split in the circuits, the Court addressed the first issue and,
over one dissent, ruled that the proper standard of review was de novo;
therefore the Court of Appeals had applied the wrong standard of review.
As a consequence of its findings of error as to the first issue, the Supreme
Court remanded on the second issue so that the Court of Appeals could
reassess the jury's punitive damage award under Gore's guidelines.
Facially, this is a tremendously important win for the business community.
But the inevitable question arises: how much difference will it make in the
real world of litigation practice? All sides concede that, realistically, the
denominations of questions of law versus questions of fact are dubious
categories at the outset. Therefore, to delineate analysis of jury awards as
exclusively one or the other is somewhat misleading and tends to mask the
way trial courts address issues in the real world of litigation. Moreover,
plaintiffs' bar has commented in the aftermath of Coopers Industries that
the outcome is hardly momentous and will have little impact on reviews of
jury awards in future cases. Plaintiffs' attorneys explain their conclusion
this way: given the porous nature of the boundary between law and fact,
appellate courts have increasingly scrutinized large punitive damage
2 66
awards, de novo, whether they acknowledge it expressly or not.
Plaintiffs' bar, thus, anticipates little change in the real world of jury
awards. However, the business bar is perhaps more insightful and has
made a better predictive "call" on the impact of Coopers Industries. It
argues that the definitive rule laid down in Coopers Industries will
reverberate down the judicial hierarchy even to state trial judges, who
(anticipating de novo Gore review) will now view jury punitive awards more

263. See Marcia Coyle, JusticesLook at Punitives, 23 Natl. L.J. B (Feb. 19, 2001).
264. 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (cited in Coyle, supra n. 263).
265. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
266. Coyle, supra n. 263, at Bl; Margaret Cronin Fisk, Punitives Ruling, 23 Natl. L.J. Al
(May 28-June 4. 2001).
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critically. 26 7 If that is so, then Cooper Industries may be, pragmatically
speaking, the most beneficent ruling for the business community on the
2000-2001 docket.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The Bush v. Gore decisions left the Court open to the charge that it
was more result-oriented than rule-driven. Those decisions contradicted
the Rehnquist Court's reputation as a centrist Court and an advocate of
judicial restraint. They were also contrary to the majority's evolving
federalism doctrine. A review of the business-related cases this term
suggests that the election decisions were not anomalous. Rather they, in
conjunction with the most important business cases this term, reflect a
decisive turn toward conservative activism on the part of the majority.
While many of the business cases this term do evince the centrism
and analytical restraint of a consensus-building Court, almost without
exception 2 68 those cases will have only a marginal impact on the nation's
businesses, either because they deal with narrow issues, or pertain only to
discrete industries or because the result reached was entirely predictable
given existing precedent. On the other hand, with the few exceptions
identified above, the decisions that will have the most significant and farreaching impact on the nation's business community were reached by the
ideological 5-4 split to which we are becoming inured. While most of these
decisions favored business interests, they may also exacerbate underlying
divisions in society and they will surely have a destabilizing effect on the
doctrines they sought to construe. In any event, these cases signal a
gestalt flip by the Court's majority-a rejection of its former centrist
paradigm.

267. See Fisk, supran. 266, at Al.
268. Notable exceptions were: TraJFix, 121 S. Ct. 1255 (unanimous decision); Tasini, 121
S. Ct. 2381 (7-2); Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (unanimous decision); and Leatherman, 532 U.S.
454 (8-1). All of these extremely important decisions represented a consensus of the
justices.
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Appendix A
Labor & Employment
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(Americans With Disabilities Act).
CircuitCity Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (arbitration).
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (Title VIM.
E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist 17, 532 U.S.
57 (2000) (arbitration).
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel.Breiner,532 U.S. 141 (2001) (ERISA).
C & L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S.
411(2001) (arbitration).
Lujan v. G & G FireSprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189 (2001) (due process).
Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001)
(arbitration).
N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001)
(National Labor Relations Act).
P.G.A. Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (ADA).
Pollardv.E.I. duPontdeNemours& Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001) (Title VII).
Taxation
Dir. of Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank A.C.B., 531 U.S. 316 (2001) (Farm
Credit Act).
Gitlitz v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 531 U.S. 206 (2001) (Subchapter
S passthrough treatment).
United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 532 U.S. 822 (2001) (income tax
computations for affiliated companies).
U.S. v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001) (F.I.C.A.
and F.U.T.A. tax calculations).
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (tribal taxation of
non-Indian commerce).
Federal Courts/Civil Practice
Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001) (notice of appeal).
Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Vd. Dept of Health and
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (ADA and other fee-shifting
statutes).
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